The Politics of Culture by Graebner, William
Review Essay 
The Politics of Culture 
William Graebner 
TIME PASSAGES: Collective Memory and American Popular Culture. By 
George Lipsitz. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990. 
The world of the 1980s and 1990s is a world of disequilibrium. On the one 
hand, politics is an alien universe, a field of insurmountable problems—the 
deficit, global pollution, an enormous underclass in the decaying inner cities— 
that no one cares to even try to solve, populated by Reagan and Bush and 
incumbents that can't be defeated, even when they do harmful things or nothing 
at all. Culture, on the other hand, is by comparison remarkably fluid and open, 
a free marketplace of words, music and pictures, at once reflecting and celebrating 
the nation's increasingly diverse population. Politics is modern. Culture is 
postmodern. 
George Lipsitz' superb study of post-World War II popular culture, Time 
Passages, exists at the site of this disequilibrium. In a series of provocative and 
finely crafted essays on film, rock *n' roll, early television, popular novels, New 
Orleans Mardi Gras celebrations, and other aspects of popular culture, Lipsitz 
argues that popular culture has been, and remains, an arena of hope, possibility, 
criticism, and even resistance for millions of ordinary people—wounded and 
anxious people, disconnected from the past and from others like themselves— 
who otherwise have felt trapped and powerless in the economic and political 
realities of postwar America. Given the choice between modern politics and 
postmodern culture, Lipsitz—and postwar Americans—have opted for culture. 
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To be sure, Lipsitz recognizes that culture is hardly the free space described 
above. Indeed, every suggestion of the alternative and oppositional possibilities 
of popular culture is preceded by a litany of dire warnings, each delivered with 
a tone of hard-boiled realism: New technologies such as television "lend them-
selves to new forms of exploitation and oppression," "trivialize and distort 
culture" and "turn art into commodities" (vii, 5); "cultural products generally 
reflect the dominant ideology of any given period" (13); "dominant ideology 
triumphed on television in the 1950s, just as it did in political and social life" (67); 
commercial mass culture "covers the globe" (233); communications takes place 
against a background of "concentrated economic and political power unprec-
edented in world history" (271). Yet popular culture survives this gauntlet and 
remains sufficiently free and independent to serve as the matrix through which 
Americans have attempted to understand, salvage and improve their lives. Hence 
I Remember Mama and other family-centered programs on mid-century network 
television "expos[ed] the contradictions of the nuclear family" (57); the music of 
barrio artist Richie Valens drew on traditional Mexican melodies, African-
American blues and rhythm & blues, and white rockabilly in a synthesis that 
represented the desires of many Los Angeles youth for a multicultural, inter-racial 
community; Detour and other films offilm noir director Edgar G. Ulmer broke 
with "dominant narratives" to depict a universe governed by fate and contin-
gency; and tribes of "Indians" (working-class black men, actually) parade the 
back streets of New Orleans at Mardi Gras, drawing on African music, the verbal 
heritage of the "dozens," and other traditions to transcend their work lives and 
become a "community of resistance and self-affirmation" (238). 
"I chose to write about the powerless," Lipsitz announces in the Preface, 
"rather than the powerful" (xi). Of the examples just listed, several—the Mardi 
Gras Indians, the Los Angeles youths that were the audience for Valens's 
records—were undeniably powerless. The other examples, however, only imply 
the existence of the powerless: i.e., the television and film audiences that watched 
Mama and saw Ulmer's films. Elsewhere, Lipsitz finesses the problem of how 
works of popular culture are received (by the powerless). He suggests, for 
example, that "maximally competent listeners" could "discover meaningful 
historical connections" in the work of David Bowie and Chuck D (104). But this 
only begs the question: are all the powerless "maximally competent listeners"? 
Surely not, and if not, what is it that ordinary, minimally competent listeners hear 
and absorb? Because he doesn't know—and probably can't know—Lipsitz can 
only speculate on what the powerless might derive, or might have derived in 1950, 
from a given popular cultural context. There is nothing wrong with this process; 
given the problems with applying reception theory to forty-year-old evanescent 
artifacts, it is surely the best one can do. But it is not equivalent to writing about 
the powerless. 
Lipsitz is an optimist While he recognizes the sordid side of the American 
past (and the limitations of the present), he explains that he is "unwilling to let the 
history of monopoly, imperialism, racism, and sexism stand for the totality of 
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American experience," preferring to offer up the "earnest longings and heroic 
struggles for something different that have characterized the American past" 
(xvi). Lipsitz offers this agenda in explicitly political terms; the ebullient 
optimism of Time Passages is intended to have therapeutic consequences: to 
empower the powerless. To do otherwise—to find only the "debased and 
distorted," is to have a "pessimism that masquerades as critique," indeed to 
collaborate "with the oppressors" (xvi). Since the products of my own hand have 
often been rather bleak in outlook, I can hardly deny to Lipsitz his preference for 
the positive. But is it necessary, or productive, to characterize those who prefer 
the dark side—or simply prefer to examine power rather than resistance to it— 
as masquerading collaborationists? Must we all practice the power of positive 
history? 
If optimism is part of Lipsitz's political strategy, it also characterizes his 
approach to popular culture texts and, more importantly, his analysis of the way 
in which those texts intersect with a larger "politics." For Lipsitz, culture is the 
reservoir of oppositional thought. Why? Partly because oppositional thought can 
survive "in the subtle nuances of cultural moments too small for co-optation or 
censorship" (132)—a 45 r.p.m. record on an independent label, a band's perfor-
mance at a neighborhood street dance, the songs of the Mardi Gras Indians, the 
films of a director operating outside the major studios. And partly because, since 
culture is made by people who oppose the dominant culture, or presented to 
people who oppose it, "all cultural expressions speak to both residual memories 
of the past and emergent hopes for the future" (13). Thus the African-American 
elements in rock 'n' roll compensate white, working-class musicians for "what 
they missed in life," and even the much vilified Amos *n' Andy television dramas 
of the late 1940s and early 1950s "contained the potential for undermining the 
commodified social relations of the present" (113,70). 
Behind Lipsitz confident assertion that "all cultural expressions" contain 
oppositional elements is the belief that culture is part of a larger system that must 
inevitably present some version of the "sedimented class tensions" (62) that lie 
just below the surface of American life. Using language reminiscent of John 
Kenneth Galbraith's description of "countervailing power" (a classic of liberal 
optimism), Lipsitz argues that even the most monolithic and centralized forms of 
cultural power—network television in the 1950s, Hollywood in the 1940s—in 
their efforts to achieve consensus and closure, offered up for public consumption 
some version of the "other." Hence the film Sergeant York could achieve a pro-
war, interventionist consensus only by first articulating a pacifist perspective. 
And the television networks, driven by the desire to reach the largest possible 
audience, "encouraged exploitation of real fears and problems confronting 
viewers" (56). 'The dominant culture," writes Lipsitz in paraphrasing Frederic 
Jameson, "can only presume to ease anxieties like disconnection from the past by 
calling attention to them in the first place, thereby running the risk of re-opening 
the very ruptures it seeks to close" (17). 
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Although Lipsitz presents this culture-as-politics perspective with bravado, 
the rhetoric of Time Passages reveals a curious lack of confidence in the efficacy 
of culture. When Lipsitz argues, for example, that rock *n' roll contains "an 
unfinished dialogue about the potential of oppositional traditions" (109), the 
word potential—a word used throughout this book—limits the claim consider-
ably. Referring to Mama, Lipsitz uses the same hedged language, noting that "at 
least the possibility [italics mine] of oppositional readings remains alive" (94). A 
brilliant exegesis of the fusions within the Los Angeles music scene is similarly 
replete with qualifiers: the city's Mexican-American musicians make "efforts," 
and they "struggle" to put together a block "capable" of challenging the dominant 
culture, but they never have real, demonstrable power (152). In some chapters 
this rhetoric of doubt reaches the level of conscious argument Lipsitz wonders 
whether the counter-narrative of the Mardi Gras Indians "actually threatens the 
hegemony of the dominant culture" (248), and, having surveyed the films of 
Edgar Ulmer, he despairingly suggests that "in the end, it may all be futile" (207). 
Further than this Lipsitz will not go. He will not take up directly the central 
problem of the relationship between popular culture and power. Nonetheless, to 
assemble a few of Lipsitz' examples is to learn how limited the power is that 
derives from culture. The characters in Samuel Fuller's films have "a certain 
moral power, a certain dignity" (190). Denied creative work lives, the working 
class finds "harmony with others" in rock 'n' roll music (113). And the Mardi 
Gras Indians discover their oppositional culture reaching the mainstream in 
popular songs such as Shirley and Lee's "Let the Good Times Roll" (1956) and 
Cyndi Lauper's "Girls Just Want to Have Fun" (1985). 
If, as Lipsitz claims, "culture exists as a form of politics" (16), it is a tepid 
politics—a politics of survival, rather than transformation. There is solid 
evidence here that the American people—some of them, anyway—continue to 
struggle against atomization, the alienated workplace, the commidification of just 
about everything, and other qualities of late-twentieth century life under capital-
ism, and, furthermore, that this struggle occurs within the frame of popular 
culture. What is missing is evidence that the struggle has produced—or can 
produce—any significant revision of the social order. Against the cultural 
evidence marshalled in Time Passages, one might offer the voting record of 
millions of working-class Americans who helped elect Richard Nixon, Ronald 
Reagan and George Bush. While one can appreciate the multicultural dream 
represented in LA's fusion music, the riots following the Rodney King verdict— 
riots that reflected the inter-racial and inter-ethnic tensions in the city—shed 
doubt on the ability of popular culture to achieve any sort of genuine reconcili-
ation in a society rent by poverty and racism. 
A healthy politics should offer more than therapy, more than potential 
benefits, more than memories of some moment in the past when times were 
good—more even, than dignity. It is the great tragedy of American life—and 
hardly grounds for optimism—that the politics of culture is the only game in town. 
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